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C00002 00002	NOTES ON WORLD PROBLEMS AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT THEM
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NOTES ON WORLD PROBLEMS AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT THEM


	Here are some propositions about the state of the world. 

	1. The  state of the  world has  been getting worse  lately. 
More and more  people are ruled by governments they didn't choose and
from which they are not allowed to escape. 

	2. It is not clear how far this will go.  The  countries that
have fallen  under Communist  dictatorships recently were  in special
circumstances.   There is cause for worry,  but many people who don't
want to take defensive measures find reasons  for their nonchalance. 
They may be right. 

	3. The immediate cause of the fall of Vietnam was the failure
of the U.S. Congress, supported  by the overwhelming majority of  the
American  people, to  carry  out  its  commitments.   The  Vietnamese
military  collapse  is  somewhat  less  discreditable  as the  French
collapse in  1940.  The  failure of  the Vietnamese  armed forces  to
fight when abandoned is as much proof that they "ought" to live under
communism was the French collapse a proof that the French should live
under Hitler. 

	4. While the American people  were wrong in not living  up to
their  commitments which  had  become a  trivial  expense, the  other
non-communist countries which either never helped at all or quit long
ago are much more to blame. 

	5. The  basic  fault was  that the  U.S. undertook  unlimited
commitments to its  allies without demanding anything in return.  The
most dramatic illustration of this arrogant mistake might be taken as
Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner"  speech which demnded nothing from a
prosperous  Germany  for  an unlimited  U.S.  commitment.   This  gave
European politicians any easy way out.  They could compete in finding
reasons for political and military irresponsibility. 

	Here  are   some  proposals  for   repairing  this  one-sided
situation. 

	6. The U.S.  should withdraw  from West Berlin  and tell  the
Germans that they can defend it themselves.  If  they want us to help
dOfend  it,  they  must do  something  substantial  in  return.   For
example, 40,000  German  troops should  replace the  40,000  American
troops in Korea with German  logistical support.  Otherwise, they can
see  if their Ostpolitik will defend Berlin.   The reason for picking
on the Germans here is not that they have  behaved especially badly -
others have behaved worse, but simply because something of theirs may
be threatened, and they  may have a motive  for paying a large  price
for our support. 

	7. The U.S. should declare that it will not defend Yugoslavia
without some help from Yugoslavia in the Middle East.  Apart from the
Soviet Union itself, Yugoslavia has done more harm in the Middle East
than any other Eastern European country. 

	8. South  Korea helped in  Vietnam, it  is a better  place to
live than  North Korea (this is shown both by economic statistics and
by the fact  that North Korea has  to impose emwgration control,  not
the other way around), and  it is probably quite effective in its own
defense, and  therefore it  deserves help.   Nevertheless,  if it  is
attacked in the  near future, it can  probably be defended only  if a
very  high level  of immediate violence  is quickly  successful.   Any
protracted conflict  may lead  to the  Congress  denying even  arms. 
President Park  has declared that  if the U.S. abandons  South Korea,
then  South  Korea  will  acquire  nuclear  weapons.    None  of  the
prognosticators of international affairs have taken  this threat into
their  calculations.  The  proposals by  Reischauer for  a conference
about Korea of the Soviet Union,  Japan, China, and the U.S. seem  to
be  preparations for  a  Munich, and  will  become realistic  if  the
Democrats get  power.  The Japanese left seems  to favor a new Korean
war, and Prime Minister Miki speaks of the Korean people's demand for
national unity without the slightest hint that they might also demand
economic  and  political  freedom.    (In  South  Korea, a  government
campaign harassing an  opposition newspaper by persuading  businesses
not to advertise  in it has just ended.   In North Korea, there never
has been an opposition newspaper and there isn't even freedom not  to
praise the  all-wise Kim  Il Sung.   This  comparison must always  be
made.). 

	Under  these   circumstances,  posessing  their  own  nuclear
weapons may be South Korea's best chance of survival.  Certainly Ford
can  give no  credible assurances.   I  would have  confidence in  an
American commitment  only if it were backed by a formal referendum of
the American people.   This seems like  a fantastic idea, but  if the
Korean intention  were credible,  and if the  dangers to us  of there
being a small  country faced  by an irrational  aging dictator  whose
survival depends  on  nuclear weapons,  then we  might  make a  solid
commitment  in order to  obviate the danger.   Those  who are worried
about the spread of nuclear weapons should also consider  the dangers
of a situation in which every country has to defend itself as best it
can,  because there is no collective  security.  It is unrealistic  to
imagine the  U.S. giving  the South  Koreans nuclear  weapons, but  I
think we  should also refrain  from trying to  kid them into  a false
sense of security.  Some of  the same consideration apply to  Taiwan,
but  for the  time  being,  the  "People's Republic"  seems  more  in
interested in  its internal affairs than in  military adventures.  Of
course, Kim may only have been bluffing, but would you count on it if
you were a South Korean? 

	7. The  above three  proposals are no  doubt shocking,  but a
shock  is  necessary.   Otherwise,  the non-communist  countries will
continue doing  nothing in  their  own defense,  and expressing  mild
alarm  when the U.S.  goes back  on commitments.   The Ford-Kissinger
policy of trying to  shore up those  unilateral commitments and  make
them credible, only postpones the day of reckoning. 

	8. It is  stupid for any  country to bet its  independence on
the  continued mutual enmity  of China  and the Soviet  Union.   Maybe
this enmity will continue, but  each country has an aging  leadership
waiting  for the  others  to die,  and  when they  to  die, there  is
absolutely no telling what their successors will do.  In fact, if the
Kruschev memoirs  are an  indicationk,  they successors  are so  busy
maintaining the  patronage of the  present rulers that  they have not
even seriously thought  about what they  will do.   The possibilities
range from liberalization to fanaticism. 

	9. Prediction in  world affairs or even domestic  politics is
an uncertain business,  and it is important to admit it.  Politicians
are overly tempted to base their policies on choosing a single future
scenario. 

	10.  While   the  number   of  Communist   dictatorships  has
increased,  and there is an increased  threat to liberal civilization
throughout  they  world, these  dangers  are  not  primarily  due  to
increased activity by the big Communist powers - the Soviet Union and
China.  They  have continued to  tell lies about  the West,  and they
have continued  to supply arms  to any  countries and movements  that
will attack  the West, they have not a taken  any initiative.  On the
other  hand, it  is  unrealistic  of  Kissinger  to  expect  positive
co-operation from them. 

	11. Moynihan (Commentary, March 1975) is right in saying that
present  revolutionary ideology is in a  large degree a descendant of
the British left wing ideology, but he doesn't sufficiently emphasize
the anti-democratic mutations this ideology has undergone. 

	12. Current left-wing  ideology is characterized by regarding
society as a  conspiracy of enemies  rather than as  a machine to  be
improved or  replaced.   It knows better  who it  hates than what  it
wants to make of the world.  To the extent that people adopt it, they
are immune  to criticisms of  the effects  of their  policies on  the
people they are supposed  to help.  It is enough  that they kill they
people they are supposed to kill. 

	13.  I fear that the  previous paragraph is  only one side of
the elephant.  Probably a clear understanding of contemporary leftism
and the circumstances  of its appeal is the  largest single chance of
avoiding dictatorships.  If  this ideology could  be defeated in  the
American intellectual community, all other problems could probably be
solved. 

	The  ideas advanced  in these notes  could be  supported with
many arguments.  It is  not claimed that they  are now in a state  to
convince  someone  of  widely  differing  views.    Rather  they  are
submitted in the hopes of a useful response from others who have been
thinking along similar lines.