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C00002 00002 NOTES ON WORLD PROBLEMS AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT THEM
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NOTES ON WORLD PROBLEMS AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT THEM
Here are some propositions about the state of the world.
1. The state of the world has been getting worse lately.
More and more people are ruled by governments they didn't choose and
from which they are not allowed to escape.
2. It is not clear how far this will go. The countries that
have fallen under Communist dictatorships recently were in special
circumstances. There is cause for worry, but many people who don't
want to take defensive measures find reasons for their nonchalance.
They may be right.
3. The immediate cause of the fall of Vietnam was the failure
of the U.S. Congress, supported by the overwhelming majority of the
American people, to carry out its commitments. The Vietnamese
military collapse is somewhat less discreditable as the French
collapse in 1940. The failure of the Vietnamese armed forces to
fight when abandoned is as much proof that they "ought" to live under
communism was the French collapse a proof that the French should live
under Hitler.
4. While the American people were wrong in not living up to
their commitments which had become a trivial expense, the other
non-communist countries which either never helped at all or quit long
ago are much more to blame.
5. The basic fault was that the U.S. undertook unlimited
commitments to its allies without demanding anything in return. The
most dramatic illustration of this arrogant mistake might be taken as
Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech which demnded nothing from a
prosperous Germany for an unlimited U.S. commitment. This gave
European politicians any easy way out. They could compete in finding
reasons for political and military irresponsibility.
Here are some proposals for repairing this one-sided
situation.
6. The U.S. should withdraw from West Berlin and tell the
Germans that they can defend it themselves. If they want us to help
dOfend it, they must do something substantial in return. For
example, 40,000 German troops should replace the 40,000 American
troops in Korea with German logistical support. Otherwise, they can
see if their Ostpolitik will defend Berlin. The reason for picking
on the Germans here is not that they have behaved especially badly -
others have behaved worse, but simply because something of theirs may
be threatened, and they may have a motive for paying a large price
for our support.
7. The U.S. should declare that it will not defend Yugoslavia
without some help from Yugoslavia in the Middle East. Apart from the
Soviet Union itself, Yugoslavia has done more harm in the Middle East
than any other Eastern European country.
8. South Korea helped in Vietnam, it is a better place to
live than North Korea (this is shown both by economic statistics and
by the fact that North Korea has to impose emwgration control, not
the other way around), and it is probably quite effective in its own
defense, and therefore it deserves help. Nevertheless, if it is
attacked in the near future, it can probably be defended only if a
very high level of immediate violence is quickly successful. Any
protracted conflict may lead to the Congress denying even arms.
President Park has declared that if the U.S. abandons South Korea,
then South Korea will acquire nuclear weapons. None of the
prognosticators of international affairs have taken this threat into
their calculations. The proposals by Reischauer for a conference
about Korea of the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and the U.S. seem to
be preparations for a Munich, and will become realistic if the
Democrats get power. The Japanese left seems to favor a new Korean
war, and Prime Minister Miki speaks of the Korean people's demand for
national unity without the slightest hint that they might also demand
economic and political freedom. (In South Korea, a government
campaign harassing an opposition newspaper by persuading businesses
not to advertise in it has just ended. In North Korea, there never
has been an opposition newspaper and there isn't even freedom not to
praise the all-wise Kim Il Sung. This comparison must always be
made.).
Under these circumstances, posessing their own nuclear
weapons may be South Korea's best chance of survival. Certainly Ford
can give no credible assurances. I would have confidence in an
American commitment only if it were backed by a formal referendum of
the American people. This seems like a fantastic idea, but if the
Korean intention were credible, and if the dangers to us of there
being a small country faced by an irrational aging dictator whose
survival depends on nuclear weapons, then we might make a solid
commitment in order to obviate the danger. Those who are worried
about the spread of nuclear weapons should also consider the dangers
of a situation in which every country has to defend itself as best it
can, because there is no collective security. It is unrealistic to
imagine the U.S. giving the South Koreans nuclear weapons, but I
think we should also refrain from trying to kid them into a false
sense of security. Some of the same consideration apply to Taiwan,
but for the time being, the "People's Republic" seems more in
interested in its internal affairs than in military adventures. Of
course, Kim may only have been bluffing, but would you count on it if
you were a South Korean?
7. The above three proposals are no doubt shocking, but a
shock is necessary. Otherwise, the non-communist countries will
continue doing nothing in their own defense, and expressing mild
alarm when the U.S. goes back on commitments. The Ford-Kissinger
policy of trying to shore up those unilateral commitments and make
them credible, only postpones the day of reckoning.
8. It is stupid for any country to bet its independence on
the continued mutual enmity of China and the Soviet Union. Maybe
this enmity will continue, but each country has an aging leadership
waiting for the others to die, and when they to die, there is
absolutely no telling what their successors will do. In fact, if the
Kruschev memoirs are an indicationk, they successors are so busy
maintaining the patronage of the present rulers that they have not
even seriously thought about what they will do. The possibilities
range from liberalization to fanaticism.
9. Prediction in world affairs or even domestic politics is
an uncertain business, and it is important to admit it. Politicians
are overly tempted to base their policies on choosing a single future
scenario.
10. While the number of Communist dictatorships has
increased, and there is an increased threat to liberal civilization
throughout they world, these dangers are not primarily due to
increased activity by the big Communist powers - the Soviet Union and
China. They have continued to tell lies about the West, and they
have continued to supply arms to any countries and movements that
will attack the West, they have not a taken any initiative. On the
other hand, it is unrealistic of Kissinger to expect positive
co-operation from them.
11. Moynihan (Commentary, March 1975) is right in saying that
present revolutionary ideology is in a large degree a descendant of
the British left wing ideology, but he doesn't sufficiently emphasize
the anti-democratic mutations this ideology has undergone.
12. Current left-wing ideology is characterized by regarding
society as a conspiracy of enemies rather than as a machine to be
improved or replaced. It knows better who it hates than what it
wants to make of the world. To the extent that people adopt it, they
are immune to criticisms of the effects of their policies on the
people they are supposed to help. It is enough that they kill they
people they are supposed to kill.
13. I fear that the previous paragraph is only one side of
the elephant. Probably a clear understanding of contemporary leftism
and the circumstances of its appeal is the largest single chance of
avoiding dictatorships. If this ideology could be defeated in the
American intellectual community, all other problems could probably be
solved.
The ideas advanced in these notes could be supported with
many arguments. It is not claimed that they are now in a state to
convince someone of widely differing views. Rather they are
submitted in the hopes of a useful response from others who have been
thinking along similar lines.